The Muslim Brotherhood was first established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 as an Islamist movement in Egypt. The 1920s was the age of ideology, in which the urban space started growing and new classes and elites were created in Egyptian society. This group was different from the preceding Islamic movements because it was all inclusive, tightly knit, appealed to a wider audience, and interacted with the local events in Egypt, as well as being the largest religious movement in the modern Middle East, (Rabi 1996: 62). Nazih Ayubi also considers this group to have had an overwhelming impact on many other political Islamist groups in other Arab countries, (Ayubi 1991: 74). To be a large political organization without direct representation in the government is impressive, and the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was already having an impact on international groups allowed it to continue to grow. This group was one of the only groups that aimed for political representation prior to the 1952 revolution. Like any large, political, and influential group, the Muslim Brotherhood was expected to face resistance as well. Richard Mitchell points out that they were always dealing with resistance and antipathy, and this started as soon as the Society began to spread. In the 1930s, hostility was confined to complaints about the movement and its intentions, especially in 1932 when the movement became larger and more urban in Cairo, (Mitchell 1993: 9-10). The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was dealing with successful spread and influence and simultaneously resistance illustrates how large of a movement this actually was and how much political power it had, especially as a group external of the government.
When former member Ibrahim Hudaiby was asked whether the Muslim Brotherhood is more of a religious group or a political group, he answered that “the first of the four pillars is belief in the comprehensiveness of Islam, and so it is an ‘Islamic group’ with a large political aspect, (Mohandisseen, 11/24/09).” This implies that the Muslim Brotherhood is intentionally a religious group and its goals aspire largely of religious awareness and observation in society. It also lives under the assumption that through this religious reformation, political improvement in Egyptian society will manifestly occur. The struggle and the changes that the Muslim Brotherhood is faced with foreshadow its increasing involvement in achieving its political vision.
Under the leadership of al-Banna, “the nascent Ikhwan movement spoke in its early phase (1928-1939) in terms of the necessity of propagation and preservation of Islam, and also in anti-imperialist terms.” One of the reasons for this anti-imperialist attitude was because the Ikhwan considered secularism as being anathema to the true spirit of Islam, (Rabi 1996: 64). Furthermore, Banna’s arrival in Cairo coincided with a period of intense political commotion, and Banna’s establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood was instigated further by his passionate reaction to this urban commotion, (Mitchell 1993: 4). Because of Banna’s passion regarding political views and religious views, it is understandable to see why the Muslim Brotherhood always carried a political element since its founding. A few of the “10 evils” were colonialism, political divisions, and secular laws (Rabi 1996: 66). Attributed to the founder, there are five documents posted on the website of the Muslim Brotherhood that state the movement’s goals since its founding. These goals include liberating “the Islamic homeland” from foreign rule, establishing a free Islamic state, and bringing together Muslim states, (Altman 2006). From these strong political aspects that the Muslim Brotherhood was founded on, it is fair to conclude that this organization had clear political goals in mind, and that increasing political activism in Egypt through time was necessary in order to achieve these goals.
Al-Banna was very clear in that he expected the Muslim Brotherhood to “avoid divisive political organizations such as parties,” however he placed great emphasis upon other types of political action, (Aly & Wenner, 1982: 340). In Hassan al-Banna’s speech, The Obstacles in Our Path, he told the Muslim Brotherhood “you are not a political party…if you are told that you are political answer that Islam admits no such distinction,” (Mitchell 1993: 30). This further exemplifies the idea that this Islamist group was created as a religious group with a strong political component, and that Banna did not wish for the group to become a political organization. Though these goals and expectations of the group was clearly stated, it can be seen later that to avoid political organization yet still have a profound political impact was too much of an idealistic thought and thus, this ruling would have to be altered by the group’s future leaders. Through times of changing political reform in Egypt and different leaderships of the Muslim Brotherhood, the position of the group regarding its place in the political sphere, rather than just its social standing, continued to change. Ideologue Sayyid Qutb had a profound impact in adding new ideas regarding the structure and organization to the group as well, especially since the new regime at the time did not accept the Ikhwan the way that it was previously set up. Eventually, Qutb was executed with other leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1966 (Ayubi 1991: 77). While Qutb was in jail, “the mood of disillusionment and remorse had been replaced by a new spirit of brotherhood activism,” (Zollner 2009: 43). This activism foreshadowed increased political involvement, and remains in the Muslim Brotherhood to this day. After al Banna’s death, Hasan Al Hudaiby took over the leadership, and he had a very different voice within the Muslim Brotherhood than Qutb or al Banna.
In the personal interview with Ibrahim al Hudaiby, Hasan al Hudaiby’s grandson, Hudaiby revealed that this group’s founder understood that the objective was to influence politics. One instance of the group’s involvement in politics occurred in 1952 after Al-Banna’s death, under Hudaiby. At this time in Egypt, the 1952 revolution was attempting to establish a republic and overthrow the existing government, and the Muslim Brotherhood could not resist supporting this movement and thus further involving themselves in the society’s politics, (Mohandisseen, 11/24/09). The changed relationship between the revolution and the Brotherhood was mainly due to Hudaiby’s unclear leadership. His aim was to help the new Egypt make its way towards parliamentary democracy, however this sparked internal resistance and other members accused him of using secular means to reform society, (Zollner 2009: 28). Right from the start of the revolution, the Brothers made reiterated pronouncements, publicly and also privately to the government, about the need for establishing government on the basis of Islam, (Mitchell 1993: 107). The revolution seems to have strengthened the views of the Muslim Brotherhood regarding its impression of an ideal government, and these facts together reveal that at this time in the organization, there was internal tension regarding its structure and its aims. The deputy of the Society stated that at the time if the Society’s attitudes towards the government were effectively split, one group would be in support, and the other, led by Hudaiby, would be passively hostile, (Mitchell 1993: 108). The Muslim Society’s attitude towards the government was splitting away from that of Hudaiby’s, and this increasing divide would only continue to increase tension within the group. “When asked whether the Brothers still held to their view of non-participation in the elections, Hudaybi answered that the days of corruption were one thing, ‘but now it is probable that the Brothers have another view,’” (Mitchell 1993: 310). This illustrates a step of change regarding political participation, and that the view of the Brotherhood regarding political participation was highly dependent on the corruption or lack of corruption present in society at the time.
Clearly, while Hudaiby was in leadership, the political aspect of society around this time was changing in such drastic ways that it would be impossible for the Muslim Brotherhood to be an effective institution without changing the level of their own activism accordingly. In 1950, Fateh Usman wrote that the Muslim Brotherhood would not actively participate in politics but be able to support it. Around 1965 following the military regime and Egypt’s transformation toa republic, young members of the Muslim Brothers were arrested in a conspiracy against President Nasser’s government and were cruelly tortured. This provoked mutiny in the detention camps in May 1967 which led to younger and more rebellious elements being isolated in special confined quarters (Ayubi 1991: 77). President Gamal Adel Nasser instituted a single-party system and banned the Muslim Brotherhood, (Hamzawy & Dunne, 2008: 26). This illustrates a very important point that the main force determining and influencing the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in governmental participation was the leading party’s stance itself on the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation. The Muslim Brotherhood remained realistic on its stance on democratic participation, and thus when it was completely unable to become a political party due to the regime in power’s rules, it would attempt to have political influence in other ways in addition to fighting for its right to remain a group.
The Nasser era remained from 1952 until 1970, and during this time the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government went through several stages, including the banning of the organization in 1954. At this time, six members of the Brotherhood were executed and 800 were given long prison sentences, while thousands were imprisoned without trial. In 1964 they were freed to counterbalance the communists’ influence, (Aly & Wenner, 1982: 342). The idea that they were seen as counterbalancing the influence of a major political group, the communists, illustrates that they were also seen as a major political group themselves. This impression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian society could also be a major reason that they were banned and imprisoned; that they would be too politically influential in society in and challenge Nasser’s governmental regime. In 1965, the Muslim Brotherhood was accused of planning to overthrow Nasser and thus some were arrested and three of the leaders were hung, (Aly & Wennner, 1982: 342). “Under Nasser all significant religious institutions were made subject to the control of the state,” (Aly & Wenner, 1982: 343). This includes the Muslim Brotherhood, and it explains their limitation of rights under Nasser’s power. Through analyzing this sequence of events, it can be argued that that the imprisonment of the Muslim Brotherhood and their lack of ability to have a stronger voice in society possibly instilled the desire in them to become even more politically active as a means of utilizing their political freedom, when given the means.
It was only after Nasser’s regime in 1970 that the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to play an increasing role in Egyptian political life, until 1981. After Nasser’s sudden death, successor Anwar as-Sadat began to rebuild the government’s relationship with society upon realizing that it needed the society’s support, (Zollner 2009: 58). Sadat’s policies allowed the brotherhood to publicly reorganize, and a reason for this was to balance the fear of increasing power of the political Left, (Aly & Wenner, 1982: 348). Hudaiby was also released from prison at this time, and the Muslim Brotherhood was invited to participate in the drafting of relevant articles and sections of the new Constitution of Egypt for the 2nd time, (Aly & Wenner, 1982: 348). With this sudden political power in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to exercise and reform its views through more channels. Earlier, Banna had declared in his plan regarding the organizations and objective of the Muslim Brotherhood that the basic aims of the Brotherhood should never change, and this included obtaining explicit recognition of its political existence.
The Muslim Brotherhood began to accomplish its goal through its active participation in the Sadat Constitution, supporting views that fit its own ideological views in the document, (Aly & Wenner, 1982: 349). This was a beneficial start of furthering political activism by the Muslim Brotherhood, as they developed a positive relationship with the government under Sadat. At this point, the first major aim of the Muslim Brotherhood was to gain more public support and reach wider audiences, and they launched a monthly journal, al-Da’wa, in an effort to do this, (Aly & Wenner, 1982: 350). During the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood also witnessed a gradual change in its composition. The members that joined the Brotherhood consisted of the “old guard” and the “new guard,” and these groups often struggled in defining the ideology. The new guard was made up of student leaders of the 1970s who were more open to change and gave more importance to the political role of the movement rather than its missionary role, and was interested in building alliances with other political organizations, (Zollner 2009: 80). “The Society of the Muslim Brothers grew, by the outbreak of the 2nd world war, into one of the most important political contestants on the Egyptian scene… members became so diversified as to be virtually representative of every group in Egyptian society” (Mitchell 1993: 12). This change in the makeup of the organization led to a gradual modification in the stance of the Muslim Brotherhood towards an acceptance of democratic participation, and the ways in which the Muslim Brotherhood would largely influence politics was becoming increasingly broader.
In the 1980s under President Muhammad Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood was granted greater freedom and started coalitions with other parties, (Hamzawy & Dunne, 2008: 35). In the journal al-Da’wa, the “new” Brotherhood demanded a complete, free and competitive party system in which it is permitted to have its own Islamic party and unofficially wanted to install democracy as a political system, (Aly & Wenner, 1982: 352). This surprising shift of the Muslim Brotherhood’s position from al-Banna’s command of “avoid divisive political organizations such as parties” to the Brotherhood’s demand to be a party expressed via al-Da’wa several decades later illustrates the transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood concerning its stance on its form of political participation. After the 1980s, Mubarak became stricter regarding political freedom when terrorist attacks and violence became widespread. In the last 10 years, the Muslim Brotherhood won 20 percent of seats in parliament under Mubarak’s constant rule, (Hamzawy & Dunne, 2008: 36). Mitchell points out that it was always manifest that the group would participate directly in governmental politics, and it was just a matter of when and on what terms, (1993: 311). The analysis of this chronology illustrates an answer to one aspect of the research question; that this change took place in the 1980s when Mubarak came to power, from following al-Banna’s command to not be a political party to becoming the leading opposition, and later even obtaining seats in parliament. The other aspect of the question of consideration is why this change took place.
Some potential reasons for why the Muslim Brotherhood changed its position on democratic participation to the point that it became a party include that it faced domestic and international encouragement. The leadership of the group is also important to consider, as every leader has different methods and ideas for achieving its fundamental goals. For example, “The opportunity to assume political responsibility through cabinet appointment was a reality only in Hudaybi’s time,” because of the fact that Hudaybi mistrusted Nasir due to “ambivalence about the wisdom of political participation necessary for the fulfillment of the message of the Society,” (Mitchell 1993: 310-311). It is possible that the Muslim Brotherhood realized that it was not possible to achieve its political goals to the level that it wanted to without having a larger voice and this would explain the deepening involvement in politics that it faced through time. Hamzawy and Dunne argue that Islamists are an unavoidable part of the political spectrum in Egypt, and there can be no credible democratization without their enfranchisement in some form (2008: 37).
In addition to this reality, societal factors also play a role as the Muslim Brotherhood is pushed by a younger generation to begin challenging the political order further. This does not directly cause the Muslim Brotherhood to be a political party, however does push them to have an increased political voice. The “new guard” members and the society began to rely on the Muslim Brotherhood for producing change and encountering Mubarak’s regime, as the Muslim Brotherhood was the main opponent of this regime and thus representative of many citizens’ views. Many supported the Muslim Brotherhood simply to oppose Mubarak’s government. In addition to social change and the rise of new generations within society, the social map began to change as certain areas of Egypt became more central for citizens of a certain religion or class. Many of these changes occurring together in Egyptian society were beneficial for the Muslim Brotherhood.
International pressure also contributes to similar trends. “Western governments, including the United States government, consider the Muslim Brotherhood and other ‘moderate Islamist’ groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps in eradicating Islamist terrorism,” (Altman 2006). It can be easily seen how this international and societal pressure for the Muslim Brotherhood to have a larger political voice has led the group to become directly involved and have seats in parliament, as this is the best way for them to have increased political power. In addition to international and societal pressure as well as the realization of the Muslim Brotherhood of the best means to achieve its goals, the shift of the Muslim Brotherhood towards democratic participation is so drastic that many additional reasons further contribute to this transformation. As predicted, one of these reasons is possibly because the Brotherhood “wishes to distance itself as much as possible from the principles and programs associated with the Nasser Era, during which time it suffered its greatest setbacks,” (Aly & Wenner, 1986: 353). The effects of societal and international pressure for the Muslim Brotherhood to be increasingly involved in politics even after it gained parliamentary seats are seen through its actions since it gained the 88 seats. Ayubi indicates that “since then the Islamists have been acting as the main parliamentary opposition group… as the more respectable Muslim Brothers become a parliamentary force, they may contain and constrain the more militant of the twenty or so Islamic groups,” (Ayubi 1991: 85). This indicates their priorities in joining the representative democratic as desires to challenge groups that they do not fully support, and to provide alternative and improved public services. The Muslim Brotherhood is increasingly supported by the younger generation as well as those who have been under Mubarak’s frustrating regime for long. This aspect of their support is a pleasant sign for the group’s future in politics.
Ever since their involvement in parliament, Egyptian citizens have hope of gaining optimism and the government has hope of gaining some legitimacy. However, many are still apprehensive that the Islamic movement may be indivisible and that the Muslim Brothers may be no more than its parliamentary façade. Ayubi states that “the conclusion to be emphasized is that the strength of a state depends greatly upon its ability to penetrate and organize society…” (Ayubi 1996: 447). If the government is successful in keeping the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliament and granting them a voice, therefore pleasing a large portion of its population, then it can gain legitimacy and perhaps compensate for its previous discouraging dynamics. Ayubi also points out that state and society relations do not resemble a zero-sum game, and that both state and Society can and must prosper together. “Arab political elites need to grasp this “lesson,” (Ayubi 1996: 450). Further, Aly and Wenner argue that the Brotherhood has become a pragmatic political organization in contemporary Egypt, (1986: 353). If these statements are accurate, then the upcoming years will only witness more involvement with the government and more participation as a political party.
In conclusion, the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt is has changed its position on democratic participation through the course of its development, from its establishment until present time. The largest change that took place occurred in the early 1980s, when the organization publically announced its goal to become a political party, and later when it obtained seats of parliament. The reasons for this change include societal pressure, international pressure, the group’s increase of passion under political suppression, and its realization that the best way to achieve its goals is to join the political system itself. Based on the analysis of the previous patterns of the Muslim Brotherhood’s stance on political and democratic participation, it is fair to assume that this increasing political activism will only continue to expand in the near future.
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